Automated Discovery of Semantic Attacks in Multi-Robot Navigation Systems
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Presented at USENIX Security 2025 by
Finding collision-free paths is crucial for autonomous multi-robots (AMRs) to complete assigned missions, ranging from search operations to military tasks. To achieve this, AMRs rely on collaborative collision avoidance algorithms. Unfortunately, the robustness of these algorithms against false data injection attacks (FDIAs) remains unexplored. In this paper, we introduce Raven, a tool to identify effective and stealthy semantic attacks (e.g., herding). Effective attacks minimize positional displacement and the number of false data injections by using temporal logic and stochastic optimization techniques. Stealthy attacks remain within sensor noise ranges and maintain spatiotemporal consistency. We evaluate Raven against two state-of-the-art collision avoidance algorithms, ORCA and GLAS. Our results show that a single false data injection impacts multi-robot systems by causing position deviation or even collisions. We evaluate Raven on three testbeds–a numerical simulator, a high-fidelity simulator, and Crazyflie drones. Our results reveal five design flaws in these algorithms and underscore the importance of developing robust defenses against FDIAs. Finally, we propose countermeasures to mitigate the attacks we have uncovered.