In my presentation, I will share a method to phish the phishing-resistant authentication mechanism, Windows Hello for Business (WHfB). Despite WHfB's design to provide secure authentication through cryptographic keys, my research uncovers a method that allows attackers to downgrade this secure method to a more vulnerable, phishable one.My research reveals how attackers can intercept and modify POST requests to Microsoft's authentication services and manipulate the system into defaulting to a less secure authentication method. This is achieved by altering parameters such as User-Agent or isFidoSupported in the authentication request. I will detail the exploitation process, showing how I have modified the EvilGinx framework to automate the attack, making it scalable. Furthermore, I will discuss mitigation strategies, specifically focusing on the implementation of conditional access policies that leverage authentication strength — a feature introduced after reporting the issue to Microsoft, designed to enforce the use of phishing-resistant methods.This presentation aims to shed light on this flaw, to provide a deeper understanding of Windows Hello for Business and to encourage the adoption of enhanced security measures.