Memory safety vulnerabilities pose a critical threat to modern computer systems, allowing adversaries to leak or modify security-critical data. In response to this, ARM has introduced PAC and MTE, designed primarily for code pointer and UAF protection. Some mobile devices (e.g., pixel8) have started incorporating these features for security. On adversary side, while there has been substantial amount attention on bypassing PAC, there has been yet little attention to MTE. We examined the security of MTE, to bridge the gap, and discovered two side-channel vulnerabilties residing in Pixel8. In this talk, we first provide a comparative analysis of PAC/MTE from an attacker's perspective, hightlighting why MTE is more challenging to bypass. Second, we explain two new side-channel vulnerabilities and how we confirmed them in Pixel8. Third, we delve into exploit techniques to bypass MTE in a real world setting, speicifically the linux kernel. Note that a huge credit goes to Juhee Kim et al (at SNU CompSec) for discovereing and reporting the two side-channel vulnerabilities for the first time, leading this research.