We will show how to use zero to attack zero-knowledge proof (ZKP). In particular, we'll discuss a *critical* issue in a cutting-edge ZKP PLONK C++ implementation which allows an attacker to create a *forged* proof that all verifiers will accept. We'll show how theory guides the attack's direction. In practice, the attack works like a charm and we'll show how the attack falls through a chain of perfectly aligned software cracks.In the same codebase, there is an independent critical ECDSA bug where (r, s) = (0, 0) is a valid signature for arbitrary keys and messages, but we won't discuss it further because it's a known ECDSA attack vector in the Google Wycheproof project that I worked on a few years ago.All bugs have been responsibly disclosed through the vendor's bug bounty program with a total reward of $15,000.