The publication of Meltdown in January 2018 was the first instance of a hardware vulnerability which broke the security guarantees of modern CPUs. Meltdown allowed attackers to leak arbitrary memory by exploiting that Intel CPUs use lazy fault handling and continue transient execution with data originating from faulting loads. With stronger kernel isolation, a software workaround to prevent Meltdown attacks, and new CPUs with this vulnerability fixed, Meltdown seemed to be a solved issue.In this talk, we show that Meltdown is still an issue on modern CPUs. We present ZombieLoad, a Meltdown-type attack which leaks data across multiple privilege boundaries: processes, kernel, SGX, hyperthreads, and even across virtual machines. We also compare ZombieLoad to other microarchitectural data-sampling attacks, such as Fallout and RIDL. We show that Meltdown mitigations do not affect ZombieLoad. The ZombieLoad attack can be mounted without any user interactions from an unprivileged application, both on Linux and Windows.To demonstrate the danger of the ZombieLoad attack, we present multiple attacks, such as monitoring the browsing behavior, stealing cryptographic keys, and leaking the root-password hash on Linux. In a live demo, we show that such attacks are not only feasible but also relatively easy to mount. We will then discuss mitigations against the ZombieLoad attack.We outline challenges for future research on Meltdown attacks and mitigations. Finally, we will discuss the short-term and long-term implications of Meltdown for hardware vendors, software vendors, and users.