DNS Tunnelling, Its all in the name!

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Presented at BSidesLondon 2010 by

In September 2000 a post came across the Slashdot website informing its readers of an interesting use of DNS tunnelling for breaking out of locked down networks. It utilises that most networks regards less of their firewall, Access Controls, would allow DNS look ups. Researchers found with crafted packets that they could in fact establish bi-direction IP traffic, they delivered a protocol named NSTX. However this concept became more widely established when the respected DNS security researcher Dan Kaminsky, released his Ozyman tool at Blackhat in 2005, Kaminsky who in 2010 became one of ICANN's Trusted Community Representatives for the DNSSEC root certificate, has an unparallelled reputation when it comes to DNS security and it insecurities. Needless to say this release caught the attention of many security researchers, however worrying nearly 11 years after the discovery and 6 years since Kaminsky's Ozyman tool release, this vulnerability still lives on in a number of networks. All though DNS tunnelling could be seen as way to obtain free Internet on captive portals, it is also an effective tool in data theft. However it is hard to imagine the limitations when this is mixed with shellcode's. DNS tunnelling could be used to reverse connect a shellcode from target to attacker, the tunnel's effectiveness of traversing NAT makes it a worthy deployment. The presentations aim is to talk about how simple it is to deploy DNS Tunnelling infrastructure at little or no cost. In addition to showing that this can be deployed from resources available on the world wide wed. The presentations aim is to show how to establish a ssh connection from target to attacker, and act as a taster for peoples further research. Presentation Outline: Together they have been in the IT profession for over 35 years. Ian primarily as a system administrator, Frank first as a programmer later as IT security something. Together they strongly believe that IT Security should have one purpose, to actually make computing and processing information more secure. As obvious as that statement seems, security measures often do not achieve this goal but sometimes hurt it. E.g. enforcing "very strong" password policies will often result in people not being able to remember their passwords and writing them down, or reverting to passwords like Password01, Password02, etc. In a light, good cop/bad cop style presentation Ian and Frank plan to address this and other less obvious examples of so called "best practices" that actually hurt security. What do you hope attendees will gain from the presentation? Besides the fact that we plan to give a very entertaining presentation, we also hope to trigger some self reflection in the IT security community. We hope to help break the inertia of certain long lived best practices that, e.g. force us to change our password every month because it takes two months to crack such a password with a PDP-11. The presentation will also provide some handles for people who share our believes to broach the subject to others. Presentation Abstract: This talk will try to address the "unaskable" question "will best practices make use more secure?" in a light and entertaining manner. Will a strong password policy result in stronger passwords? When are there too many admins on the system? In good cop/bad cop style Frank Breedijk and Ian Southam will address this topic from the firm believe that IT Security should actually make IT more secure.