Historically, cryptographic modules were embedded in Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) and secured by placing them in a physically secure environment. Nowadays, tokens are becoming more ubiquitous outside of secure environments: smart cards, and various USB and standalone tokens or cryptographic services. Even though these devices protect confidential information using cryptographic algorithms that withstand rigorous cryptanalytic attacks, an adversary that has physical access to a device can obtain secret information by modifying the behavior of the chip through hardware attacks such as Fault Injection. These faults can be induced by over-clocking, introducing transients in power and clock lines (a.k.a power and clock glitches) or through optical radiations. The experimental setup to induce these faults is invasive in nature. The power and clock lines to the target are to be isolated to induce voltage or clock faults, which may not be possible in real-world cases. Although fault injection through optical radiation can be very precise, the die of the chip needs to be exposed through decapping. Recently a new class of fault attack was introduced, which uses an electro magnetic field to induce faults in the target device. The Electro Magnetic Field Fault Injection (EMFI) perturbation is powerful and completely non-invasive in nature. The background, methodology and experimental setup required to conduct EMFI will be discussed in this presentation. The impact of different types of probes used in EMFI attacks is explored and a calibration process used for lab experiments is presented. We discuss our preliminary results and conclude EMFI is a viable strategy for an attacker attempting to break a cryptographic implementation.