Industrial Control System Cyber Security 96 Selected Case Histories

No ratings

Presented at Amphion Forum DC 2012 by

Industrial control systems (ICSs) monitor and control the industrial infrastructures of electric power, water, chemicals, pipelines, mass transit, etc. They are functionally, administratively, and operationally different than IT systems. ICSs consist of human-machine interfaces (HMIs) which are generally Windows workstations or PCs and field devices which utilize proprietary real time operating systems and have minimal if any security. Specifically, there is a lack of ICS cyber forensics and logging at the field devices. There have been more than 200 actual ICS cyber incidents to date with the vast majority not having been identified as cyber. These incidents are real and have caused significant impacts. To date in the US, there have been four ICS cyber incidents that have killed people, three major cyber-related electric outages, and two nuclear plants shut down from full power. A recent ICS cyber incident in Asia killed more than 70 while lifting a 100 ton turbine off its pedestal. The bullet train crash in China killed more than 30 people and appears to be an ICS cyber incident. The Stuxnet worm was in the wild for more than a year causing significant equipment damage before it was identified. What is common to all of these incidents is the lack of control system cyber forensics and logging and the inadequacies of traditional intrusion detection systems for detecting control system cyber incidents. This presentation will address ICS cyber incidents in general and focus on several ICS cyber incidents. Cases will include the San Bruno natural gas pipeline rupture, the Bellingham gasoline pipeline rupture, the 2008 Florida Outage, and the recent Illinois water system hack. The presentation will address what is publicly known, similarities and differences to previous ICS cyber incidents, and identify types of cyber forensics needed for these and other ICS cyber incidents.