Any App, No Permission: Two Independent Authorization Bypasses in Microsoft Entra Verified ID

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Presented at fwd:cloudsec Europe 2026 by

What if the fastest way to break an authorization system wasn't finding more permissions, but removing them all? Most cloud identity research starts by looking for over-privileged service principals. I decided to do the opposite: remove every permission I could and see what still worked. That simple experiment led to a months-long investigation into Microsoft Entra Verified ID, Microsoft's decentralized identity platform. Along the way I uncovered two independent authorization flaws affecting different management surfaces, each rooted in very different assumptions about how trust should be established inside Azure. Rather than focusing solely on the vulnerabilities themselves, this talk walks through the research process: how small inconsistencies turned into exploitable findings, how to recognize patterns that deserve deeper investigation, and how seemingly unrelated services can reveal entirely different classes of bugs. Whether you're interested in Microsoft Graph, cloud identity, or simply improving your methodology for finding logic bugs, you'll leave with a repeatable approach for uncovering security issues hiding behind "working as designed" assumptions.