Modern hardware-assisted Control Flow Integrity (CFI) is increasingly deployed across mobile devices and cloud infrastructure. On ARM64 systems, backward-edge protections such as Pointer Authentication (PAC) protect return addresses, while forward-edge defenses such as Branch Target Identification (BTI) restrict indirect branches to compiler-inserted landing pads. Together, these mechanisms are intended to prevent traditional code-reuse attacks such as ROP and JOP.In this Briefing, we will present SROP/BTI, a novel exploitation technique that bypasses hardware CFI on modern ARM64 Linux and Android systems and enables arbitrary control-flow execution even when PAC and BTI are fully enforced.We identify a gap between hardware control-flow validation and POSIX signal handling. While processors validate indirect branches against landing-pad instructions, signal delivery restores execution context directly from user-controlled memory during sigreturn. Because this restoration does not pass through a validated branch, it creates a kernel-assisted control-flow transfer that escapes landing-pad enforcement.Turning this gap into a reliable exploit primitive is non-trivial, as hardware CFI constrains the initial entry into sigreturn and complicates attack bootstrapping. We introduce CFI-safe stack pivots, control transfers that remain valid under hardware CFI while enabling signal-driven execution. Using crafted signal frames and these pivots, we build an exploitation framework that operates entirely within the hardware CFI model while recovering arbitrary control-flow execution.We will present live demonstrations against current ARM64 Linux and Android systems protected by BTI and PAC.