Official AI-agent workflows increasingly run as trusted, unattended automation. These workflows are not a single decision point: they are built from internal stages that decide what is approved, sanitized, and safe to reuse during execution. Our research identifies a distinct failure class inside those official workflow paths: the product marks state as safe, and a later component in the same workflow interprets or consumes that state more powerfully than the earlier decision accounted for.Across Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI, we found the same trust-handoff failure recurring in official agent workflows. In Claude Code, a shipped default approval rule can still allow arbitrary shell command execution because validation and execution interpret the same attacker-controlled argument differently. In Gemini CLI, environment sanitization does not survive the real execution path: secrets remain reachable at runtime, and later processing can re-inject stripped state. In Codex, attacker-written workflow state can later be loaded as trusted instructions or execution context, turning temporary influence into persistence and policy loss.The Briefing gives attendees a practical way to audit other agent workflows for the same mistake: identify where the product marks something as safe, trace that same state forward, and test whether the product's trusted state can actually be turned into execution, secret disclosure, persistence, or policy bypass.